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Abstract
We present a dataset of several fault types in control surfaces of a fixed-wing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) for use
in Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) and Anomaly Detection (AD) research. Currently, the dataset includes processed
data for 47 autonomous flights with scenarios for eight different types of control surface (actuator and engine) faults,
with a total of 66 minutes of flight in normal conditions and 13 minutes of post-fault flight time. It additionally includes
many hours of raw data of fully-autonomous, autopilot-assisted and manual flights with tens of fault scenarios. The
ground truth of the time and type of faults is provided in each scenario to enable evaluation of the methods using the
dataset. We have also provided the helper tools in several programming languages to load and work with the data and
to help the evaluation of a detection method using the dataset. A set of metrics is proposed to help to compare different
methods using the dataset. Most of the current fault detection methods are evaluated in simulation and as far as we
know, this dataset is the only one providing the real flight data with faults in such capacity. We hope it will help advance
the state-of-the-art in Anomaly Detection or FDI research for Autonomous Aerial Vehicles and mobile robots to enhance
the safety of autonomous and remote flight operations further. The dataset and the provided tools can be accessed
from http://theairlab.org/alfa-dataset.
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1 Introduction
The recent growth in the use of Autonomous Aerial Vehicles
(AAVs) has increased concerns about the safety of the
autonomous vehicles, the people, and the properties around
the flight path and onboard the vehicle. To address these
concerns, much research is being done on new regulations,
more robust systems are designed, and new systems and
algorithms are introduced to detect the potential hardware
and software issues.
In order to detect hardware issues, many methods have
been introduced. These methods can be categorized in
several ways: they can be learning-based or not, online
or offline, detecting the type of the fault or detecting the
anomaly. Each category has its pros and cons. For example,
learning-based methods can learn models for different types
of faults and predict the learned faults with high precision;
however, they may not be able to detect new issues and are
generally dependent on the availability of a large amount of
training data, which is not always the case. Khalastchi and
Kalech (2018) provide a useful review and comparison of
different fault detection methods in robotics.
Collecting flight data from real aircraft to test a new Fault
Detection and Isolation (FDI) or Anomaly Detection (AD)
method is a difficult task; the hardware is expensive, the tests
are time-consuming and imposing some of the fault types
can lead to the loss of control of the vehicle. As a result,
most of the proposed methods are only tested in simulation
(Abbaspour et al. (2017); Melody et al. (2000); Khalastchi
et al. (2013)). The results reported by these methods may
be very different from the real data, making a comparison
between these methods with the other methods tested on
real flight tests difficult. Even many of the methods tested
on the real flight data only report a minimal number of
tests (Sun et al. (2017); Lin et al. (2010); Bu et al. (2017))
and only a few proposed methods have done a reasonable
number of tests on the real flight data (Keipour et al. (2019);
Venkataraman et al. (2019)). Providing a large dataset to the
FDI and AD community working on UAVs will open the
opportunity to test the proposed methods on real data and
to compare the results with other methods.
In this paper, we present the Air Lab Fault and Anomaly
(ALFA) Dataset, which currently includes processed data for
47 autonomous flights with scenarios for eight different types
of control surface faults, including engine, rudder, aileron(s)
and elevator faults. The processed data consists of a total
of 66 minutes of normal flight and 13 minutes of post-fault
flight time. The dataset also includes several hours of raw
autonomous, autopilot-assisted, and manual flight data with
tens of different fault scenarios. The ground truth for the
exact time and type of the fault in each scenario in the
processed data is provided to help with the evaluation of
the new methods. A small portion of this dataset has been
already used by Keipour et al. (2019) in the evaluation of
a real-time anomaly detection method. The current paper
describes the dataset in details and opens the access to the
complete set of the processed and raw sequences along
with the telemetry and dataflash log data of all the flights.
Additionally, we provide a set of helper codes for working
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Figure 1. The Carbon-Z T-28 fixed-wing UAV platform
equipped with an onboard computer and additional modules for
our dataset collection. This is the same platform used by
Keipour et al. (2019) in a previous work.
with the processed data and helping with the evaluation of
the new methods in C++, Python and MATLAB languages.
The dataset and the tools can be accessed from http:
//theairlab.org/alfa-dataset.
In the next section, the platform used for the collection
of the dataset and the changes needed to enable the creation
of faults are described; Section 3 explains the details about
the data and the usage of the dataset; Section 4 proposes
the metrics for evaluation of new methods; finally, Section 5
summarizes the paper and proposes ideas for the future work.
2 The Platform
2.1 Hardware Setup
The platform used for the collection of the dataset is a custom
modification of the Carbon Z T-28 model plane. The plane
has 2 meters of wingspan, a single electric engine in the front,
ailerons, flaperons, an elevator, and a rudder. We equipped
the plane with a Holybro PX4 2.4.6 autopilot, a Pitot Tube, a
GPS module, and an Nvidia Jetson TX2 onboard computer.
In addition to the receiver, we also equipped it with a radio
for communication with the ground station. Figure 1 shows
the described platform.
2.2 Software
The Pixhawk autopilot uses a custom version of Ardupi-
lot/ArduPlane firmware to control the plane in both manual
and autonomous modes and to create the simulations. The
original firmware is modified from ArduPlane v3.9.0beta1 to
include four new parameters as follows:
DisableEngine: This parameter can disable the engine to
simulate a complete engine failure;
DisableElevator: This parameter can fix the elevator in the
horizontal position to simulate the stuck elevator;
DisableRudder: It can fix the rudder all the way to the left,
right or in the middle to simulate the rudder hardover;
DisableAileron: It can fix the left aileron, right aileron,
or both in the horizontal position to simulate the stuck
aileron(s).
For safety reasons, all the parameters are programmed to
only work in the autonomous mode; at any time during the
autonomous flight, the safety pilot can take over the control
of the plane and all the disabled actuators and the engine will
start working normally again. The commands for disabling
Figure 2. The communication between the safety pilot, the UAV
and the ground control station (GCS). The pilot only takes over
when the safety is going to be compromised. The GCS is used
for disabling the desired control surfaces in the autonomous
mode.
the control surfaces (modifying the mentioned parameters in
the autopilot) can only be sent through the ground control
station (GCS). Figure 2 shows the communication between
the pilot, plane and the GCS.
The onboard computer uses Robot Operating System
(ROS) Kinetic Kame on Linux Ubuntu 16.04 (Xenial) to
read the flight and state information from the Pixhawk using
MAVROS package (the MAVLink node for ROS). The data
is recorded as a rosbag, and the ground truth about the
faults is periodically published by a node which checks the
status of the mentioned custom parameters. The autonomous
flight uses a trajectory controller modified from the work
of Schopferer et al. (2018) to enable the control using the
onboard TX2 computer instead of the ground station.
Furthermore, to access information about the internal
commands of the autopilot (e.g., commanded roll/pitch),
both the firmware and MAVROS are modified to publish the
desired information in high frequency using the MAVLink
protocol.
3 Dataset
The presented dataset is entirely collected in an airport
around Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Figure 3 shows the location
of the tests as well as a sample trajectory used in the recorded
autonomous flights. Each flight sequence usually includes
only a portion of the full trajectory, which can be extracted
from the data.
This section describes the data in the dataset in more
details, lists the types of faults that are in the dataset, and
discusses the provided tools to work with the data and to
evaluate an FDI or anomaly detection method using the data.
3.1 Data Formats
The dataset consists of 4 types of data, described as below:
– Autonomous flight sequences with failures: Flight
sequences processed to only contain autonomous flight
data and to include failure ground truth data only when
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Figure 3. The location of the data recorded and the trajectory
used in some of the flight tests.
Table 1. Fault types in the processed dataset.
Fault Type # of TestCases
Flight Time
Before Fault (s)
Flight Time
w/ Fault (s)
Engine Full Power Loss 23 2282 362
Rudder Stuck to Left 1 60 9
Rudder Stuck to Right 2 107 32
Elevator Stuck at Zero 2 181 23
Left Aileron Stuck at Zero 3 228 183
Right Aileron Stuck at Zero 4 442 231
Both Ailerons Stuck at Zero 1 66 36
Rudder & Aileron at Zero 1 116 27
No Fault 10 558 -
Total 47 3935 777
there is a fault. Each file contains a flight sequence with
at most one fault. The data is provided in three formats:
Comma-Separated Values (csv), MATLAB’s mat, and
the original ROS bag.
– Raw flight sequences: Flight data for flights in all the
modes without any preprocessing and is only provided
in the original ROS bag format. Some files may include
multiple failure test scenarios, while the others may
contain no autonomous flight at all. All the files from the
first category are cut from these files.
– Telemetry logs from TX2: All the telemetry data is
recorded by the onboard TX2 computer from the tests
without any preprocessing. The files do not contain the
fault ground truth information and can be useful for
unsupervised detection methods. More information about
the format is available on the ArduPilot website.∗
– Dataflash logs from Pixhawk: All the data recorded
on the Pixhawk autopilot from the tests without any
preprocessing. The files do not contain the fault ground
truth information and can be useful for unsupervised
detection methods. More information about the format is
available on the ArduPilot website.
The directory structure of the dataset is shown in Figure 4.
The main focus of this dataset is the first data type (the
processed flight sequences), and the next few subsections
will describe these files in more details.
3.2 Fault Types
The types of the faults currently provided by the dataset are
listed in Table 1.
/
processed
carbonZ <date/time>[ n] <failure>
carbonZ <datetime>[ n] <failure>.mat
carbonZ <datetime>[ n] <failure>.bag
carbonZ <datetime>[ n] <failure> <topic1>.csv
.
.
.
carbonZ <datetime>[ n] <failure> <topicX>.csv
...
raw
carbonZ <datetime1>.bag
carbonZ <datetime2>.bag
.
.
.
telemetry
<date1>
flight1
flight.tlog, flight.tlog.raw, mav.parm
flight2
flight.tlog, flight.tlog.raw, mav.parm
...
...
dataflash
<date1>
<datetime1>.bin
<datetime1>.bin-<number>.mat
<datetime1>.bin.gpx
<datetime1>.bin.param
<datetime1>.kmz
<datetime1>.log
<datetime2>.bin
.
.
.
.
.
.
Figure 4. The directory structure of the dataset.
As can be seen, a large portion of the dataset is on engine
failure, which is provided to help with the Machine Learning-
based methods. However, we tried to provide various faults
in order to encourage the methods that work on multiple
faults.
3.3 Data Description
The processed file sequences in mat and bag formats
include all the available topics, while each csv file includes
one topic.
Each sequence includes information received using the
modified MAVROS (as explained in Section 2.2), including
the GPS information, local and global state, and wind
estimation. Most of the topics are inherited from the original
non-modified MAVROS module. These topics are usually
available at 5 Hz or higher, and their description can be
viewed from the MAVROS website†.
∗http://ardupilot.org/plane
†http://wiki.ros.org/mavros
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Figure 5. A sample portion of a data file showing the moment
that an engine failure happens and some additional high
frequency information provided.
In addition to the original MAVROS topics, high-
frequency data (between 20 Hz and 25 Hz) is provided on
the measured (by sensors) and the commanded (by autopilot)
roll, pitch, velocity, airspeed, and yaw. The names of these
topics start with mavros/nav info/; for example, for
roll the topic name is mavros/nav info/roll.
At last, the ground truth information is provided as topics
for each control surface, starting with failure status/.
The topics are as follows:
– failure status/engines: The value becomes
true when engine failure happens.
– failure status/aileron: The value becomes non-
zero when an aileron failure happens. The value of 1
means the failure is on the right side; the value of 2 means
that the left aileron is failed; the value of 3 means that both
ailerons are failed. Failure here is defined as the aileron(s)
getting stuck in zero position.
– failure status/rudder: The value becomes non-
zero when a rudder hardover happens. The value of 1
means that the rudder is stuck in zero position; the value
of 2 means that it is stuck all the way to the left; the value
of 3 means that the rudder is stuck all the way to the right.
– failure status/elevator: The value becomes
non-zero when an elevator failure happens. The value of 1
means that the elevator is stuck in zero position; the value
of 2 means that it is stuck all the way down.
The ground truth topics appear in a sequence only when
there is a fault happening on that control surface. These
topics are recorded at about 5 Hz rate; therefore, the first
failure ground truth message can happen after up to 0.2
seconds after the exact moment of the fault. Figure 5 shows
a sample of the data for the moment when an engine
failure happens. It also shows some of the topics in the
data, including the additional data provided by the modified
MAVROS.
3.4 Using the Dataset
The bag files can easily be played back using the shell
commands provided by rosbag ROS package. Besides, the
base tools are provided that allow working with the dataset
using C++’11, MATLAB and Python 3.x programming
languages. The functionalities include loading a dataset file
in memory, iterating through the whole dataset or a single
topic in timestamp order, plotting a specific topic field, and
some other methods like filtering the data for normal flights
from the post-fault flight. There is no dependency on ROS or
any other external packages, and all the code is written using
the standard libraries of these programming languages.
The base code is provided in C++’11 language to help
with the evaluation of new fault and anomaly detection
methods. It automatically subscribes to the ground truth
topics and waits for the method to publish the detection. It
then returns information about the false positives, the delay
in the detection, and some other statistics.
4 Evaluation Metrics
The metrics used for the evaluation of a new method can
vary based on the class of the method, the type of the faults
and the application of the method. For example, for online
methods, the delay between the fault happening and the
detection can be critical for the safety of the flight, while
for the offline methods this metric may not be as important
and in many cases (e.g., for fault classification methods) it
can be meaningless. We propose the following metrics for
the evaluation of methods using the provided dataset:
– Maximum Detection Time: For online methods, the delay
between the time a fault happens and the time it is detected
is an important factor when comparing two methods. In
real applications, a large detection delay in any scenario
can lead to irreversible situations, resulting in the complete
loss of control of the vehicle. Therefore, the maximum
detection time is a useful metric for the evaluation of
online methods.
– Average Detection Time: The average detection time
over the set of fault scenarios shows the overall time
performance of a method in detecting faults and is also
a useful metric for the evaluation of the online methods.
– Accuracy: This metric is the ratio of the number of
correctly classified sequences to the total number of
sequences. Any false result (false fault detection or
not detecting a fault) is considered as a misclassified
case. This metric considers all the positive and negative
sequences and is suitable to get an overall idea about the
performance of an algorithm, but works best when the
false detections and false negatives have similar costs.
– Precision: This metric is the ratio of the sequences with
correctly predicted faults to the total number of detections
(both true and false positive detections). Each sequence
containing a false detection counts as a false positive and
each sequence containing only correct detection(s) counts
as a true positive. This metric indicates how reliable is the
method when it announces a fault.
– Recall: This metric is the ratio of the sequences with
correctly predicted faults to the total number of sequences
containing fault(s). Each sequence containing only correct
detection(s) counts as a true positive. This metric indicates
how reliable is the method in detecting the faults.
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5 Summary and Future Work
In this paper, we presented ALFA dataset that provides
autonomous flight data of a fixed-wing UAV with scenarios
of different control surface faults in the middle of the flights.
We believe that this dataset will be highly useful in Fault
Detection and Isolation (FDI) and Anomaly Detection (AD)
research.
The presented ALFA dataset is the most extensive dataset
for fault and anomaly detection in Autonomous Aerial
Vehicles, but it is by no means a complete dataset. The
dataset contains several sudden control surface failures, but
many more types of faults can happen in UAVs, including
issues in sensors and gradual errors. We invite other groups
and researchers to contribute to the dataset by providing their
test data with other types of faults and platforms. It will
significantly increase the speed of research in this area and
will help with benchmarking future methods.
We provided base codes to help with using the dataset and
evaluation of the new methods with it. To further extend
the usefulness of the data, it will be beneficial to create
a benchmark to provide researchers with a better tool to
compare their methods with the state-of-the-art.
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